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that	the	piece	of	UXO	had	been	just	beyond	
the	 limits	of	 a	 local	military	 training	area.	
No	other	source	of	UXO	contamination	was	
identified	in	this	case.	
A	 similar	 accident	 happened	 to	 Z.	
Urazov,	15,	an	inhabitant	of	Rudaki	district.	
Having	found	a	piece	of	UXO	while	 tend-
ing	animals	in	the	community	grazing	area,	
he	lost	his	right	hand	and	eye	as	a	result	of	
the	explosion.
Additional	examples	of	incidents	involv-
ing	ERW	are	noted	in	the	brief	stories	at	the	
top	of	the	page.	These	are	clear	indications	
of	 continuous	 suffering	 in	 the	 Rasht	 and	
Tavildara	 areas	 where	 ordnance	 was	 fired	
from	aircraft	during	the	civil	war.
Collection and Demolition of ERW
Tajikistan,	 as	 State	 Party	 to	 both	 the	
Ottawa	 Convention	 and	 Protocol	 V	 of	
the	 Convention	 on	 Certain	 Conventional	
Weapons,	 takes	 all	 the	 necessary	measures	
to	find	and	demolish	mines	and	ERW.	
On	2	December	1994,	 the	President	of	
the	Republic	of	Tajikistan	issued	the	Decree 
on Voluntary Surrender and Recapturing of 
Fire Arms and Military Ammunitions from 
the Population.	 This	 decree	 became	 an	 in-
strument	for	disarming	illegal	armed	groups	
and	 recapturing	 firearms	 that	 remained	 in	
the	hands	of	the	civilian	population.	Table	1	
shows	the	number	of	firearms	returned	from	
1994	to	2006.
In March 1993, two brothers—Bahriddin and Nuriddin Eshonov, ages 18 and 17—found a 
piece of ERW and began to open it. This action resulted in an explosion and the brothers 
were both killed. 
In	 accordance	 with	 the	 agreement	 be-
tween	 the	 government	 of	 the	 Republic	
of	 Tajikistan	 and	 the	 Organization	 for	
Security	and	Co-operation	in	Europe	dated	
16	May	2005	and	within	the	framework	of	
the	 Programme	 of	 Small	 Arms	 and	 Light	
Weapons,	an	Explosive	Demolition	Centre	
was	 established	 within	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Defence.	Its	major	objective	is	to	facilitate	
the	demolition	of	ERW.	More	than	70	met-
ric	tons	(77	tons)	of	ERW	have	been	demol-
ished	as	of	19	October	2006,	and	the	work	
is	ongoing.	
Conclusion
Taking	 the	 serious	 consequences	 of	
ERW	 into	 consideration,	 it	 is	 necessary	
to	point	out	that	the	adoption	of	Protocol	
V	by	the	international	community	and	its	
entry	 into	 force	 has	 great	 importance	 for	
the	safety	of	civilians.	Of	course,	it	signifi-
cantly	depends	on	the	process	of	accession	
of	the	governments	and	the	fulfilment	of	its	
Kalashnikov gun ,101
Pistol 2,6
Rifle 3,0
Other types of guns 1,02
Hunting gun/ERW ,06
Total 26,865
On 23 July 1993, 11-year-old Khusrav Rafiyev found an item of UXO and tried 
to burn it. The resulting explosion blinded the boy. 
On 23 April 2005 two brothers—Salim and Mahmadali Saimuddinov, ages 8 and 
9—and 5-year-old Fathiddin Ilhomiddinov from the village of Khost found a piece 
of UXO while they were gathering wood. They began to cut it with an axe which 
resulted in an explosion and all three of the boys were seriously injured.
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provisions	by	State	Parties.	TMAC	hopes	
the	 implementation	 of	 Protocol	V	 allows	
all	parties	to	take	practical	measures	to	de-
molish	 ERW	 efficiently	 and	 productively	
to	provide	safety	for	all.	
See Endnotes, page 109
Two	children	walking	along	a	dusty	road.
Obsolete	 ammunition	 is	 a	major	 problem	 in	many	 countries,	 especially	in	war-torn	 countries	 like	Afghanistan,	 Iraq,	Sudan	 and	Lebanon.	To	restore	peace,	it	is	imperative	to	dispose	of	the	ammunition,	as	this	will	
reduce	 the	 capabilities	 to	 continue	 the	warfare.	 Explosive	 remnants	 of	war	 are	
normally	 destroyed	by	 open	burning	 or	 open	detonation	 (OB/OD)	 in	 suitable	
amounts	 according	 to	 national	 regulations	 or	 according	 to	 International Mine 
Action Standards 11.10 and 11.20.1	These	methods	create	environmental	problems,	
however,	as	huge	quantities	of	metal	fragments,	dust	and	nitrogen	oxides	(NOx)2	
are	emitted	to	the	environment.
Agenda for ERW and Ammunition Stockpile Disposal 
As	a	result	of	the	end	of	crises	and	conflicts	around	the	world,	vast	quantities	
of	ammunition	have	been	destroyed	by	OB/OD.	They	have	come	from	a	variety	
of	sources,	primarily:
•	 Excess	 stocks	 of	 military	 ammunition	 resulting	 from	 the	 ending	 of	
crises/conflicts
•	 Unexploded	ordnance	on	former	military	training	or	gunnery	ranges
•	 Mines	and	UXO	remaining	from	military	and	some	civil	conflicts
The	amount	of	ammunition	in	abandoned	stockpiles	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	
comprises	several	hundred	tonnes	of	various	types	of	munition.	
In	the	wake	of	the	recent	conflicts	in	the	Persian	and	Balkan	areas,	many	
questions	have	been	raised	about	post-war	effects,	such	as	the	environmental	
pollution	caused	by	OB/OD	of	ammunition	 stockpiles.	Kuwait	has	claimed	
compensation	from	the	Iraqi	government	for	severe	damage	of	the	desert	en-
vironment	caused	by	chemical	pollution	of	sand	and	soil	because	of	OB/OD	
Industrial Ammunition Stockpile 
Recovery: Saving Energy and Resources 
and Protecting the Environment
This article presents the opportunities for the disposal of ammunition in an economically and 
environmentally feasible way, focusing on post-conflict disposal of larger stocks of ammunition 
with a special view to the ongoing Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programme in Afghanistan 
managed by the Afghanistan New Beginning Programme. The contents of the article are based 
on the experiences gathered under the umbrella of the research and development programmes 
Western European Armament Group European Cooperation for the Long-Term in Defence and 
European Union L’Instrument Financier pour L’Environnement (EU LIFE), together with a study 
carried out for NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency, followed by field studies on ammunition 
stockpile destruction in mine-action programmes. 
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disposal	 of	 abandoned	 Iraqi	 ammunition	 after	 the	
First	Gulf	War	in	1991.	
Today	 the	 international	 market	 for	 scrap	 metal	
is	 very	 favourable,	 and	 the	 prices	 of	 scrap	 iron	 and	
especially	 copper,	 stainless	 steel	 and	 aluminium	
are	rising.	
Recovery	 and	 recycling	 of	 explosives	 for	 industrial	
use	 has	 not	 proven	 feasible.	 Recycled	 explosives	 from	
ammunition	are	not	competitive	with	industrially	man-
ufactured	 explosives.	 However,	 explosive	 compounds	
might	 be	 incinerated	 for	 energy	 recovery	 or	 reclaimed	
for	fertilizing	or	other	chemical	purposes.	
The	clearance	of	abandoned	ammunition	stocks	in	a	
post-conflict	area,	necessary	logistics	management	and	
implementation	 of	 appropriate	 ammunition-disposal	
procedures	require	a	lot	of	human	resources.	The	work	
related	to	ammunition-stockpile	management	is	highly	
suitable	 for	demobilisation,	demilitarisation	and	rein-
tegration	programmes.
Taking	 all	 environmental,	 economical	 and	 social	
benefits	derived	from	the	recovery	of	ammunition	stock-
piles	 into	 consideration,	 industrial	 ammunition	 stock-
pile	 recovery	 is	 far	 preferable	 to	 the	 currently	 applied,	
normal	practice	of	OB/OD.	However,	further	investiga-
tion	and	proof	of	concept	is	urgently	needed.
Table	1:	Firearms	returned	between	1994	and	2006.
1
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Principles of Demilitarisation and  
Ammunition Disposal
Demilitarisation	 of	 ammunition	 can	 be	 performed	
in	 many	 ways.	 Different	 techniques	 and	 methods	 for	
demilitarisation	of	ammunition	are	presented	in	IMAS	
11.10.	 Figure	 1	 illustrates	 a	 general	 methodology	 for	
demilitarisation.	There	 are	many	phases	 to	 follow	and	
options	that	can	be	chosen.	Each	phase	is	composed	of	a	
set	of	processes	and	many	of	the	stages	consist	of	a	num-
ber	of	substages.	The	most	appropriate	demilitarisation	
process	to	be	implemented	will	be	dictated	by	a	number	
of	 factors,	 such	as	 available	 technology,	 environmental	
legislation,	 contract	 conditions,	 commercial	 issues	 and	
safety	regulations.
Munitions	are	inherently	dangerous	and	the	demili-
tarisation	process	involves	considerations	about	explosive	
safety	and	environmental	risks.	In	particular,	downsizing	
and	treatment	stages	are	the	most	critical,	during	which	
the	explosive	components	are	subjected	to	processes	that	
can	be	hazardous	depending	on	the	working	methods,	
sensitivity	of	the	explosive	components,	etc.
In	 order	 to	 save	 resources	 and	 protect	 the	 environ-
ment,	 demilitarisation	 processes	must	 aim	 for	maximal	
recycling	and	minimal	waste	disposal.	Furthermore,	the	
processes	must	be	as	harmless	as	possible	with	respect	to	
workers’	health	and	safety,	and	emissions	into	the	atmo-
sphere,	soil	and	water.
Munitions	 are,	 with	 few	 exceptions,	 designed	 with	
focus	on	the	use	phase,	and	little	or	no	thought	is	given	
during	the	design	phase	to	the	end-of-life	stage,	when	de-
militarisation	is	required.	Consequently,	demilitarisation	
of	munitions	 is	 often	 a	more	 complicated	 process	 than	
initial	 construction.	Modern	design	of	munitions	 is	be-
coming	more	and	more	complex,	and	therefore	demilita-
risation	has	to	be	more	carefully	considered	at	this	initial	
stage.	With	growing	 requirements	 for	 insensitive	muni-
tions,3	the	energetic	constituents	are	evolving	and	becom-
ing	more	difficult	to	deal	with	compared	with	traditional	
explosives,	such	as	TNT.	Munitions	containing	TNT	can	
easily	be	melted	out,	since	TNT’s	melting	point	is	lower	
than	that	of	water;	however,	new	filling	compositions	tend	
to	be	based	on	nitramines4	 embedded	 in	 a	 cross-linked	
polymeric	matrix5	with	a	higher	melting	point.	
Mobile Ammunition Disposal Plant
In	May	2000	NIRAS	DEMEX	published	a	report,	
Research and Development Technologies for Safe Disposal 
of Explosive Wastes,	which	compiled	the	results	of	a	proj-
ect	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 EU-LIFE	 programme.	 The	
project	demonstrates	by	means	of	 laboratory	 tests	 that	
it	 is	 possible	 to	 extract	 the	 explosive	 content	 from	 the	
ammunition	shells,	mix	it	with	water	and	incinerate	the	
resulting	mixture	without	risk	of	explosion.	
NIRAS	Chemcontrol	 has	 designed	 and	 set	 up	 both	
large	incinerators	and	small-scale,	mobile	incinerators	for	
disposal	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 like	 pesticides,	 PCB,	 etc.,	
such	as	the	one	shown	to	the	right.	NIRAS	DEMEX	and	
NIRAS	Chemcontrol	 have	 further	 been	 responsible	 for	
the	design,	construction	and	setup	of	a	plant	for	ignition	
of	 fired	 small	 ammunition	 at	 the	Danish	 Ammunition	
Arsenal,	as	shown	in	the	photo	on	the	next	page.	The	pro-
cess	ensures	any	remaining	explosive	material	within	the	
disposed	ammunition	items	is	burned	out	and	is	done	so	in	a	way	that	guarantees	
safe	handling	and	eventual	recycling	of	the	shells.
During	the	incineration	of	explosives,	it	is	possible	to	recover	the	generated	en-
ergy	and	clean	the	exhaust	gases	so	the	emissions	comply	with	the	environmental	
requirements	in	the	area.	This	technique	is	therefore	preferable	to	OB/OD	from	
an	environmental	perspective.	Moreover,	mobile	incineration	units	can	be	estab-
lished	on-site	and	thus	offer	the	same	logistic	advantages	regarding	local	disposal	
of	ammunition	waste	as	the	currently	used	OB/OD.
The	extraction	of	the	explosives	from	the	ammunition	shells	and	their	incin-
eration	has	only	been	tested	on	a	laboratory	scale,	however.	A	full-scale	demonstra-
tion	test	is	under	preparation.	
Proposed Design for Mobile Ammunition Disposal Plant 
Overall layout. Due	to	the	safety	risks	associated	with	the	transport	of	am-
munition,	having	a	relocatable	or	transportable	facility	for	its	safe	disposal	con-
stitutes	an	essential	advantage.	Obsolete	ammunition	is	normally	stockpiled	at	
a	number	of	depots,	and	it	is	preferable	to	dispose	of	the	ammunition	on	prem-
ises	instead	of	transporting	it	 to	a	central	 facility.	For	practical	reasons,	 it	 is	
also	preferable	 if	 the	disposal	unit	 can	be	
shipped	by	normal	road	transport.
Extraction of explosive material and 
preparation of explosive/water mixture. 
Explosive	 content	 is	 extracted	 from	 the	
shells	by	high-pressured	water.	The	shell	 is	
then	cleaned	so	the	metals	can	be	recycled,	
constituting	 a	 considerable	 income	 from	
the	overall	process.	In	regions	where	armed	
conflicts	 are	 still	 ongoing,	 shells	 should	be	
transported	outside	 the	 country	 to	prevent	
them	from	being	retrofitted	with	explosives.	
The	 transport	 of	 ammunition	 shells	 is	 not	
problematic,	 as	 they	are	composed	of	non-
explosive	and	non-hazardous	materials.
The	extracted	explosive	material	is	mixed	
with	water	in	such	a	proportion	that	the	re-
sulting	mixture	has	some	specific	properties	
with	 respect	 to	 explosive	 capability.	An	 im-
portant	criterion	is	that	the	mixture	shall	not	
explode	by	shock	or	exposure	to	temperatures	
below	60	C	(140	F).	The	mixture	is	not	con-
sidered	explosive	material,	and	can	therefore	
be	stored	in	dedicated	vessels	until	disposal.
Incineration process. The	 explosive/
water	mixture	is	pumped	into	the	primary	
incineration	 chamber,	 where	 a	 pilot	 flame	
ensures	 the	mixture	 is	 ignited	 and	 the	 in-
cineration	 process	 is	 initiated.	 The	 incin-
eration	 speed	 is	 an	 important	 operation	
parameter,	which	 is	 also	 controlled	by	 the	
mixture	composition.	Too	fast	an	incinera-
tion	 speed—e.g.,	 too	 high	 a	 proportion	 of	
explosive	material—could	damage	the	equip-
ment,	or	in	the	worst	case,	the	plant	could	ex-
plode.	Too	low	an	incineration	speed—e.g.,	
too	much	water	in	the	mixture—might	hin-
der	 the	 ignition	of	 the	mixture.	The	 results	
obtained	during	the	LIFE	project	have	been	
valuable	 in	 estimating	 the	 optimal	 water/	
explosive	proportion.
A	 secondary	 combustion	 chamber	
could	be	installed	to	guarantee	the	destruc-
tion	 of	 organic	 compounds.	 In	 this	 way,	
European	criteria	for	incineration	of	hazard-
ous	waste—e.g.,	more	than	two	seconds	at	
1,100	C	(2,012	F)—would	also	be	met.
Energy recovery.	 A	 boiler	 is	 installed	
to	 recover	 the	 energy	 generated	during	 the	
incineration	of	 the	water/explosive	mixture	
and	reuse	it	for,	among	others,	heating	pur-
poses.	 The	 energy	 recovery	 supplies	 added	
income	for	the	project.
Flue-gas cleaning.	A	full	flue-gas	clean-
ing	system	is	installed	to	minimise	the	emis-
sions	and	ensure	they	comply	with	the	legal	
requirements.	 It	 is	 expected	 the	 emissions	
will	comply	with	the	rigorous	EU	emission	
requirements	 for	 incineration	 of	 hazard-
ous	 waste.	 The	main	 focus	 of	 the	 flue-gas	
cleaning	system	will	be	removal	of	dust	and	
nitrogen	oxides.
An	 emission-monitoring	 system	 will	
continuously	 ensure	 air	 emissions	 comply	
with	 the	 established	 legal	 requirement	 for	
the	flue	gases.	
Control system.	The	incineration	pro-
cess	 is	 carefully	 controlled	 by	 a	 computer	
system	to	ensure	safe	and	environmentally	
sound	 operation.	 In	 case	 of	 abnormal	 op-
eration,	 the	 process	 will	 be	 stopped	 in	 a	
controlled	manner.
Mechanical	safety	measures	are	incorpo-
rated	to	protect	the	equipment	from	damage	
in	case	of	improper	operation	or	unexpected	
events.	A	tentative	sketch	of	the	overall	pro-
cess	is	shown	in	Figure	2	below.
Ammunition Stockpile Destruction 
Programme of Afghanistan
The	 Afghanistan	 New	 Beginning	 Pro-	
gramme	launched	the	ammunition	destruc-
tion	 project	 in	 December	 2005,	 based	 on	
the	Anti-Personnel	Mines	and	Ammunition	
Stockpile	Destruction	Project.6
Coalition	 Forces	 and	 the	 International	
Security	 Assistance	 Force	 in	 Afghanistan	
have	 conducted	 and	 continue	 to	 conduct	
the	destruction	of	ammunition	stockpiles	in	
Afghanistan.	However,	this	work	is	not	coor-
dinated	with	the	United	Nations	Mine	Action	
Centre	 for	 Afghanistan	 or	 ANBP	 and	 has	
sometimes	resulted	in	failed	bulk	demolitions	
and	the	accidental	displacement	of	ammuni-
tion,	 requiring	 time-consuming	 explosive-
ordnance-disposal	cleanup	operations.
The	ammunition	destruction	project	is	a	
continuation	 of	 the	 Afghan	Disarmament,	
Demobilisation	 and	 Reintegration	 Pro-	
gramme	 managed	 by	 ANBP.	 During	 the	
DDR	activities,	a	large	amount	of	stockpiled	
ammunition	was	found	and	ANBP	became	
aware	of	the	need	for	ammunition	stockpiles	
to	be	destroyed.	Parallel	to	the	ammunition	
destruction	project,	ANBP	 is	 also	 running	
the	Disbandment	of	Irregular	Armed	Groups	
Removal from storage
Transportation
and intermediate storage
Preparation and pretreatment
Downsizing
Treatment
Disposal of
waste
Recovery of
scrap iron and 
metal
Recovery of
energy and
chemicals
Figure	2:	DEMEX	/	Chemcontrol	facility	for	mobile	ammunition	disposal	plant.	Ref.	ANBP	Anti-Personnel	Mine	and	Ammunition	Stockpile	Destruction	Project	Document,	Annex	2.
Mobile	incineration	plant	for	hazardous	waste.
PHOTO	COURTESY	OF	MOGENS	STRAARUP/NIRAS	CHEMCONTROL
Figure	1:	Schematic	illustration	of	the	typical	sequences	of	demilitarisation.
Treatment	of	disposed	small-calibre	ammunition.
PHOTO	COURTESY	OF	MOGENS	STRAARUP/NIRAS	CHEMCONTROL
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Project.	 The	 DIAG	 project	 has	 Weapon	
Collection	 Teams	 that	 perform	 similar	
work	to	 that	of	 the	previous	DDR	Mobile	
Disarmament	Units.	The	 ammunition	 the	
WCTs	find	will	be	handled	within	the	am-
munition	 destruction	 project.	 The	 project	
has	been	running	since	December	2004.	The	
organisation	 of	 the	 ammunition	 destruction	
project	is	shown	to	the	right	in	Figure	3.7
The	 Anti-Personnel	 and	 Ammunition	 Stock-
pile	 Destruction	 Programme	 under	 the	 supervi-
sion	of	the	Ministries	of	Defence	and	Interior	and	
the	 National	 Department	 of	 Security	 are	 being	
surveyed,	 and	 the	 ammunition	 is	 classified	 into	
three	categories:
1.	 Ammunition	 required	 by	 the	 Afghan	
National	Army	for	service
2.	 Ammunition	that	might	be	required	for	ser-
vice	of	the	ANA
3.	 Ammunition	to	be	destroyed,	including	APMs
During	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 ammunition	 from	 the	 cache,	 ANA	
transports	the	first	two	categories	of	ammunition	together,	and	there	
is	no	registration	of	 the	 specific	 types	of	ammunition	belonging	to	
each	of	the	two	categories.
ANBP	 transfers	 serviceable	 ammunition	 to	 temporary	 and	per-
manent	ammunition	storage	points	called	Temporary	Ammunition	
Consolidation	Points	and	Permanent	Ammunition	Supply	Points,	re-
spectively.	Two	Ammunition	Supply	Points	are	planned	in	the	Kabul	
area	and	another	five	elsewhere.	The	ASPs	are	mainly	existing	storage	
sites	that	have	to	be	repaired	and	secured.	They	need	to	be	cleared	of	
UXO	and	the	ammunition	already	stored	has	to	be	sorted.	Some	of	
the	ASPs	are	ready,	and	ANA	has	started	transporting	ammunition	
to	some	of	the	prepared	Ammunition	Survey	Teams.
Each	of	the	eight	Ammunition	Survey	Teams	simultaneously	un-
dertakes	the	ammunition	survey	in	multiple	locations	on	a	nationwide	
basis.	ANBP	conducts	the	transportation	of	serviceable	ammunition	
to	regional	ammunition	supply	points	with	assistance	from	the	U.S.	
company	UXB	International	and	ANA.	ANA	handles	storage	of	the	
ammunition	without	 support.	Destruction	 of	 unserviceable	 ammu-
nition	(unsafe,	unpacked	and	non-required)	and	APMs	is	conducted	
by	implementing	partners,	The	HALO	Trust	and	UXB	International,	
by	means	of	open-air	burning	and	bulk	demolition.	
The	Ammunition	Survey	Teams	are	surveying	ammunition	cach-
es.	The	ASTs	also	empty	 the	ones	not	considered	usable	 for	 future	
storage.	Unsafe,	unwanted	and	 illegal	ammunition,	 including	anti-
personnel	mines,	are	destroyed	by	implementing	partners.	The	rest	is	
moved	to	Temporary	Ammunition	Consolidation	Points.	The	survey	
teams	 consist	 of	 one	 ANA	Team	Leader,	 one	 ANA	Deputy	Team	
Leader,	one	International	Adviser,	one	Translator/Associate	and	four	
drivers.	Each	team	has	two	trucks	and	two	cars.	Technical	assistance	
is	provided	by	HALO	Trust	personnel.
The	 actual	 destruction	 of	 ammunition	 is	 conducted	 by	 imple-
menting	partners	including	The	HALO	Trust,	RONCO	Consulting	
Corporation	and	UXB	International.
Proposed Industrial Ammunition Disposal Programme
for Afghanistan
By	the	end	of	2005	it	was	estimated	that	total	stocks	of	abandoned	
ammunition	 in	Afghanistan	 amounted	 to	 50,000–100,000	 tonnes	
(55,000–110,000	U.S.	tons).	Some	of	the	ammunition	was	deemed	
serviceable	by	the	Afghan	Army	and	had	to	be	recovered,	while	the	
remaining	stocks	had	to	be	demilitarised.	
New strategy.	The	EU	prepared	a	new	strategy	for	
ammunition	 management	 for	 the	 Afghanistan	 gov-
ernment.8	 Current	 demilitarisation	 practice	 by	 OB/
OD	may	 only	 be	 used	 up	 to	 2007.	 Starting	 in	 2007	
demilitarisation	 of	 ammunition	 shall	 be	 performed	 in	
an	environmentally	friendly	way.	By	2012	all	unservice-
able	 and	 unwanted	 ammunition	 currently	 stored	 shall	
be	destroyed.	
It	is	proposed	that	the	demilitarisation	should	be	per-
formed	 in	accordance	with	 the	European	Commission	
principles	 of	 best	 available	 technologies	 not	 entailing	
excessive	cost,	the	EC	directives	of	waste	management9	
and	the	International	Mine	Action	Standards.10	
Most	 likely	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	 ammunition	
that	 has	 been	 consolidated	 will	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 obso-
lete	or	unserviceable	stockpiles	that	must	be	destroyed.	
However,	ammunition	 stockpiles	contain	valuable	ma-
terials	that	can	be	recovered.	If	innovative,	environmen-
tally	 friendly	demilitarisation	techniques	are	proven	to	
be	cost-effective,	then	scrap	metal	and	explosives	could	
be	 recycled	 for	 commercial	use.	Energy	 and	nitrogen-
based	compounds	can	be	recovered	from	explosives	to	
be	used	in	fertilisers	and	scrap	metal	can	be	recovered	
from	 the	 casing	 materials.	 The	 present	 world	 prices	
for	 scrap	 steel	 are	 relatively	 high	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	
recommended	 that	 an	 industrial	 demilitarisation	 sys-
tem	 should	 be	 analysed	 in	 detail,	 with	 the	 indirect	
objectives	 of	 improving	 business	 activities	 and	 creat-
ing	employment	 for	 the	 local	Afghan	population.	An	
industrial	 demilitarisation	 system	 could	 be	 estab-
lished	in	connection	with	the	Temporary	Ammunition	
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Consolidation	 Points,	 for	 example	 a	 mobile	 demilitarisation	 plant	 based	 on	
closed	incineration	or	similar	technologies.	
It	is	strongly	recommended	that	open	burning/open	detonation	of	ammuni-
tion	 should	not	 continue	 as	 a	demilitarisation	 technique,	due	 to	 the	proven	
environmental	damage	and	inefficient	use	of	resources.
Furthermore,	 it	 is	 mentioned	 that	 UNDP	 South	 Eastern	 and	 Eastern	
Europe	Clearinghouse	for	the	Control	of	Small	Arms	and	Light	Weapons	has	
considerable	 experience	with	demilitarisation	 technologies,	 and	 the	publica-
tion	Briefing 18—Biting the Bullet11	gives	practical	guidelines	for	the	ammuni-
tion	stockpile	management.
Capacity building.	 It	 is	 a	 priority	 for	 EC	 projects	 to	 build	 up	 local	 capac-
ity.	After	 one	 year	 of	 ammunition	 stockpile	 destruction,	 an	 appropriate	 national	
capacity	has	been	established.	A	capacity-building	plan	is	supposed	to	be	prepared	
with	 special	 focus	 on	 local	 ammunition	 technicians	 and	 leaders	 of	Ammunition	
Survey	 Teams.	 Furthermore,	 the	 capacity-building	 plan	 must	 be	 accompa-
nied	by	a	plan	 for	 transfer	of	ownership	 from	ANBP	to	a	 local	organisation	and	
by	 a	 specific	 exit	 plan	 for	 ANBP,	 the	 international	 implementing	 partners	 and	
Technical	Advisors.
It	is	assumed	that	the	initial	phase	of	the	ammunition	destruction	programme	
will	 be	 implemented	 via	 cooperation	 between	 U.N.	 humanitarian	 organisa-
tions,	 international	NGOs	and	other	civil	 implementing	partners	on	one	 side	
and	the	military	society	(including	the	Coalition	Forces/International	Security	
Assistance	Forces),	ANA,	police,	and	security	forces	on	the	other	side.
It	 has	 been	 proposed	 that	 industrial	 ammunition	 recovery	 might	 be	
transferred	 to	 commercial	 companies—possibly	 international	 companies	 in	
cooperation	with	local	companies—in	accordance	with	specific	international	
procedures	stipulated	by	the	donor	organisations.	The	contract	must	be	based	
on	industrial	demilitarisation	practices	in	compliance	with	the	above-mentioned	
requirements	for	health,	safety	and	environmental	protection.	
For additional references for this article, please visit http://snipurl.com/15i4j.
See Endnotes, page 109
Figure	3:	The	ammunition	destruction	project.	(*ATO=Ammunition Technical Officer)
Demilitarisation	process	by	OB/OD	of	tank	ammunition	and	rockets	in	Afghanistan.
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